Bulgaria

Final ranking: 59th place
Coach: Dimitar Penev

Bulgaria came to France with the load on their shoulders of having to confirm their achievement of reaching the semifinals in 1994, before that never having survived the group games.

Coach Dimitar Penev, in his playing days a top class striker and still capable of showing excellent ball skills, organized a training camp in Germany (24–30 May) and another in Sofia (2–6 June). In between he had announced his team selection, and they were the ones who took part in the final session to polish their skills. Two trial matches were played, against the German league champions, 1. FC Kaiserslautern, and the Algerian national team. On 8 June the delegation arrived in France.

Neither Bulgaria nor Paraguay wanted to risk losing the opening match, and with this safety first attitude in mind it was not surprising that the game ended goalless. In their second match, against Nigeria, the Bulgarians were outclassed, especially in the first half. They were always a step behind, slow to react and they wasted the few chances they did manage to create. The second half showed an improvement, but not enough of one to correct the scoreline, which stayed at 0:1. This meant that the Eastern Europeans were already out. That left one more match, and despite their having no hope of making further progress, more resistance would have been expected from the Bulgarians. As it was Spain gave them a demonstration of how the game is played and the brutal 1:6 result was a fair reflection of the match.

Bulgaria played without fire or motivation. The delight they had shown four years earlier was gone. Players like Stoitchkov, Balakov and Iliev never approached their best form. The only ray of hope in the team was provided by Borimirov (who replaced Iliev in the second match) and goalkeeper Zdravkov, who stopped what was stoppable. All the pride and passion and the technical refinements of USA 1994 were missing.

What can be rated on the positive side was the public relations work of the delegation. No training session of the team was closed off from the public, and the players had their photos taken with children from local teams, gave autographs freely and were generally very friendly. Their contacts with the media were cheerful occasions too. Thus it was a pity that this delegation did not have a longer stay.

From left, back row: Ivanov, Zdravkov, Kischischev, Petkov, Iordanov, Penev; front row: Iliev, Nankov, Stoitchkov, Balakov, Yankov

Krassimir Balakov (10, in the match versus Nigeria), like the rest of his Bulgarian team, failed to live up to expectations.
France 1998 was not a World Cup that caused any huge surprises. This was true of the group games and in the next two rounds as well. Even though some of the favourites had to work hard for their success, they were almost without exception the ones that got through. For example, Brazil's disappointing showing against Norway in the last group game gave Chile hopes of upsetting the South American hierarchy in their second round match, but Brazil brought them quickly down to earth, especially in the first half (two goals following free kicks and one from a penalty), and there was no way back after that.

Italy's efforts in their first three games also led Norway to believe that they could create a surprise, but an early goal from Vieri forced the Scandinavians to abandon their own preferred counter-attacking style and to make the play themselves. This showed up their own limitations - not enough ideas or penetration - and when they did put a promising move together, Pagliuca was in top form to end their hopes, especially with one semi-miraculous save from the best chance of all.

The Nigerians were so full of confidence before their match with Denmark that they did not waste a lot of breath on this game, their sights already being set on the next one, probably against Brazil. This was all to the advantage of the clever Danish team whose lightning start to the game destroyed the Africans' ideas of invincibility. With goals from Møller and Brian Laudrup putting the Europeans 2:0 ahead after just 12 minutes, the game was practically decided. The Nigerians tried to get back into the game, but mostly via individual actions and these were competently dealt with by the Danish defence. When Babangida did score to salvage some honour, there were already 4 goals on the other side of the score-sheet.

Although France had made a study of the reasons behind Paraguay's defensive strength, they were still unable to achieve a breakthrough within normal playing time. It took a crisp shot from Laurent Blanc in the 24th minute of extra time to get the Golden Goal that saw France into the next round. Until then, Paraguay had pinned their hopes on getting through to a penalty shoot-out, where they fancied the exceptional prowess of Chilavert tipping things in their favour. And until the 114th minute this plan seemed to be working, but Blanc's shot gave even this keeper no chance (Chilavert was nonetheless voted into the All-star team).

Against Mexico, Germany wobbled but did not fall. With the Central Americans providing unexpectedly tough opposition, it took goals from Klinsmann and Bierhoff and a determined team effort all round to get the European champions into the last eight. Before this game Mexico had never been ahead in any match, and suddenly finding themselves in this position in this vital game, they seemed unable to hold on to their lead.

In their match in Toulouse, Yugoslavia were not adventurous enough to pose a real threat to Holland. Even if the result (2:1) looks very close, the Oranjes were never in any serious danger of losing. Only when Mijatovic took a penalty (and hit the bar) with the score at 1:1, did there seem to be any possibility that the Dutch might falter.

Romania's early qualification for the second round did not seem to sit well with the team. They failed to regain the rhythm of the early matches and against Croatia they seemed totally cramped. Had goalkeeper Stelea not produced some wonderful saves in this game, the margin of defeat would have been far greater than just 0:1.

The final team to qualify for the quarter-finals was Argentina, who at the end of an entertaining, up-and-down game with England, finally got through on penalties after a 2:2 draw. When Beckham was sent off early in the second half, the 1966 world champions were in a difficult position. But their usual fighting spirit, backed up by some good ideas and technical skill meant that the result was open until the end, and either team could have gone on to win.

The quarter-final line-up looked just as it had four years earlier - an exclusive European/South American affair. Six to two was the ratio in basic figures, but in terms of the number of teams per confederation at the start of the tournament, it was balanced, each getting 40% through to this stage. The classic battle
on paper should have been France versus Italy, but on the pitch it was not a game to go down in the fans' record book. Each team knew the other too well and they both managed to neutralize the other's strengths. That was one reason, and another was that Italy could not, or did not want to, do much attacking. They concentrated on a massed defence that made it hard for the French to score and so after 120 minutes there had been no goal at either end. This heralded the second penalty shoot-out of the competition, and as in the USA in 1994 Italy came off second best. Even if Roberto Baggio did not miss this time around, Di Biagio did, sending his shot high over the bar. Before this critical moment Pagliuca had saved from Lizarazu and Barthez from Albertini.

While Brazil should have been warned by Denmark's surprisingly clear win over Nigeria, they too were taken by surprise at the start of the match. A quickly-taken free kick (a Danish speciality) put the Europeans ahead after just two minutes. But unlike Nigeria, Brazil managed to equalize shortly afterwards and then after another quarter of an hour put themselves in front. After the break, Denmark again proved themselves the better starters and drew level following a lapse on the part of Roberto Carlos. Yet once again Brazil came back with a third and final effort to conclude what had been a superb match.

Back in 1978, Holland had lost to Argentina 1:3 in the World Cup final and in France they managed to exact revenge. In one of the best of all the games in this tournament, it looked for a long time as if more penalties would be needed to reach a decision, with the score standing at 1:1 just before the end (goals from Kluivert and Lopes). Then things got hectic. A confrontation in the Dutch goal area saw Ortega dismissed with a red card for an attack on goalie van der Sar, and almost in the next move Frank de Boer hit a wonderful pass of around 60 meters. Bergkamp controlled it masterfully and shot his team into their third semifinal in World Cup history.

Paradoxically, while Germany had not looked very convincing in earning their place among the last eight, having got there they put on one of their best performances against Croatia – and lost. No ifs and buts about the scoreline, it was 0:3. The reigning European champions generated a lot of pressure in the first 40 minutes and limited the Croatians to sporadic counter attacks. But just before half time two events happened that decided the game. First, Germany's Worns was justifiably sent off for an unnecessary and harsh foul, and a few minutes later, Jami put Croatia into the lead. Despite a great effort after the break, Germany did not manage to get back into the game and the other two goals from Vlaovic and Suker sealed the fate of the three-times former world champions.

Brazil and Holland were definitely among the most skilful sides in the competition, and so their semifinal encounter was anticipated eagerly as a match of great potential. And it proved to be just that, especially during the second half and in extra time, captivatng the 54,000 spectators in Marseille. The match went into extra time after Kluiverthad equalized the goal that Ronaldo had scored with the first attack after the interval. While both teams had chances to end the match before the 120 minutes were up, neither managed to do so and the third penalty-kick decision became necessary.
This was Taffarel's big moment, as he kept out attempts from Cocu and Ronald De Boer. With van der Sar less successful in his efforts, the Brazilian keeper emerged as the matchwinner for his team.

It had probably never occurred to Lilian Thuram before the World Cup started that he would be the one to score two goals in one match (his first ever for the French national team) and earn his country a place in the final. But he did just that in the second half against Croatia, who had taken the lead with a Suker strike just after half time. The answer was not long in coming, as almost in the next move Thuram got his first, and then the second sealed the fate of the Eastern Europeans who had no answer once the French had gone into the lead.

The same score (2:1) was on the board at the end of the play-off match for third place, in which Croatia beat Holland, the Dutch seeming less than fully motivated on this occasion, and earned themselves bronze medals on their first-ever appearance at a World Cup final round.

«Le jour de la gloire est arrivé»: probably no other sports event in French history has been a more appropriate match for this line from the «Marseillaise» than the victory of the tri-colour team in the new Stade de France as a climax to the World Cup France 98. On the day, the French, led by their playmaker Zinedine Zidane, produced some wonderful moments of football against a surprisingly passive Brazilian side. And not only did Zidane organize his team's attacks, he scored goals himself. Well screened by the unselfish play of Petit and Deschamps, this talented player of Algerian descent shocked the Brazilians in the 27th minute with a headed goal, and then put in another one during the first half stoppage time. Although they were reduced to 10 men when Desailly was sent off after 68 minutes, the French not only managed to contain the Brazilians for the last part of the game but in fact went further ahead when Petit scored via a counter-attacking move. The final whistle from referee Belqola (Morocco), the first African ever to officiate at a World Cup final, sent the whole of France into a frenzy of delight. On the Champs Elysées alone, over a million people celebrated right through the summer night until the next morning.

The architect of the French victory was coach Aimé Jacquet. But in line with the proverb that the prophet is not listened to in his own country, his tactics did not always meet with approval in France. Yet in the end the win over Brazil, and in particular the decisive way it was achieved, proved him completely right. His accomplishment was to select the right balance from his squad of 22 players for every match, and to have a plan in mind that would compensate for unforeseen absences; three key players were sent off at various times, Zidane against Saudi Arabia, Blanc against Croatia and Desailly in the final, but the team never lost its harmony when changes had to be made.

In the following section, there is an analysis of the 16 teams that qualified for the second round (in alphabetical order). This is based on observations made by members of the Technical Study Group during matches and training sessions, and also includes information gathered during discussions with coaches of the participating teams.
Argentina

Daniel Passarella, captain of the Argentina side that won the World Cup in 1978 and the most prolific goalscorer by far of all defenders (over 180 goals, including 24 in international matches) became coach of the national team in September 1994. It would be his task to lead Argentina back to the very top, after the World Cup 1994 had been anything but a satisfactory episode. Could he take his team back to the former days of glory? Things began well with a silver medal at the Olympic tournament in Atlanta in 1996, and it was no surprise that a good number of the players successful on that occasion were included in the newly assembled World Cup hopeful team.

But their qualification for France 98 did not start as well as they had hoped. An opening win against Bolivia was followed by dropping points against Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay. Passarella found himself coming in for heavy criticism from the demanding Argentine public. Then an impressive unbeaten run in the remaining qualification games (five wins and two draws) quietened the critics and allowed the team and the association to prepare for France with some optimism.

Finally 14 players from the Olympic squad were selected, and seven of them were first team choices. Their preparations were all carried out at home; there was a training camp in January in Tandil (a province of Buenos Aires), then a number of friendly matches were played against European opposition.

In April Passarella assembled his players in the Argentine Association’s training centre and on 19 May he announced his final selection.

Argentina used a 3-4-3 as their basic formation but this was variably interpreted. In defence they had libero Ayala playing slightly deep of the two man-markers Sensini and Chamot (in fact Sensini had to contend with a series of minor injuries and was replaced by Vivas in the matches against Jamaica, Croatia, and England). Ayala’s strengths were his clever positional play, his exact long passing and his power in the air. Sensini and Chamot are two highly experienced defenders, both having played in the USA in 1994. Sensini had a good overview, liked to go forward into attack and was able to tackle hard but fairly when he had to, while Chamot was also a firm tackler, fast and possessed of good technical skills.

Under pressure, the defence would be supported by the four midfielders. Almeyda, as libero in front of the defence, had a special function to fulfil in trying to disturb an opponent’s attacks as early as possible. Then they had Veron in the middle, Zanetti on the right and Simeone on the left in midfield. Veron was the team’s playmaker. His accurate passing set up chances for the strikers, while his hard and precise shooting made him a threat up front as well. Simeone brought experience from a number of FIFA competitions with him (he first played on the international stage at the WYC in Saudi Arabia in 1989). As captain he was a real leader and a motivator for his team. Zanetti was notable for his physical ability and his surprising and effective forward surges.

The attack consisted of Batistuta, Lopez and Ortega, three quite different types of player. Batistuta is a classical goalscorer and always on the lookout for the direct route
to goal. His dynamic pace and his instinct for being in the right place made him a constant threat. The hattrick he scored against Jamaica was his personal high point in France. Lopez was also quick, and his speed made him a typical counter-attacker. He liked to be set off with a through pass and then he was very dangerous. The calm way he scored the equalizer against Holland was most impressive. Ortega ranged between midfield and attack, always changing his position according to the state of the game. He too was quick off the mark and also a tricky dribbler, making him a handful for any defender.

Argentina had all that it takes to play attractive football. They were quick, they combined well together, they were creative. They liked to attack, were mobile and persistent when they went forward. The well-planned free kick variation that brought them the 2:2 equalizer against England was a masterpiece. With their good organisation and their tactical discipline they were one of the best teams in the competition. But they lost the discipline for a short while in the quarterfinal against Holland, and this lapse was decisive and responsible for their elimination. After Ortega had quite rightly been sent off, their opponents from the final of 1978 calmly took advantage of Argentina's disarray and scored what was not an undeserved winning goal, but it was hardly expected at this stage of the game.

The outstanding players in this strong all-round side were Veron, the thinker and the director in midfield with his powerful shot, Ortega, despite his lapse against Holland, and of course Batistuta. In the next bracket follow the young Gallardo, not often used but clearly very talented, Almeyda as the stabilizing force in defence, and libero Ayala who will be wearing the colours of AC Milan in the new season.

But despite Almeyda and Ayala, the defence was the weakest part of the team. Even goalkeeper Roe, who was only promoted by Passarella to the no. 1 spot shortly before the World Cup began, was not totally convincing, despite his performance during the penalty-shooting versus England. In defensive midfield there was too much space available for opposing attackers (Owen's goal in the second round). Partly responsible for this shortcoming were the three forwards who hardly ever involved themselves in any defensive actions.

Juan Veron (11, sparring with the Englishman, Beckham) was Argentina's angler and pivot in midfield.
Argentina was faced with greater problems than they had expected from Japan. Batistuta is seen trying to forge his way past Akita.

The Argentine squad tangoed around World Cup newcomers Jamaica to win 5-0. Lopes (7) is seen here dancing his way through the entire defence but failed to stake a claim in the goal scorers' list.
From left, back row: Taffarel, Rivaldo, Cesar Sampaio, Aldair, Junior Baiano, Cafu; front row: Ronaldo, Roberto Carlos, Bebeto, Leonardo, Dunga

But none of them succeeded. However, Brazil had to give everything they had, particularly against Holland, and Taffarel's great performance in the penalty shoot-out stood between them and elimination.

The result of the final against France is well known, but the reason for the surprisingly weak performance from the South Americans remains a mystery. Rumours about Ronaldo's health were still circulating weeks after the event, and even we cannot shed any light on the matter. It is hard to imagine that a team of the quality of the reigning world champions would be so affected by the health of one player, even if that player was Ronaldo, or that their game would suffer so much.

The Brazilians used the same system that had brought them success 4 years earlier (basically 4-4-2, switching to 4-1-3-2 when the opponent had the ball and to 2-4-4 when they were in possession themselves). Taffarel, Aldair, Bebeto, Cafu, Dunga and Leonardo were all back again from the 1994 team. In goal Taffarel was calm and effective, showing good reactions, while in front of him Aldair and Junior Baiano were the central defenders and they were not always convincing. In the air their height made them formidable, but on the ground and in overall defensive play (positioning, tackling, speed) they were less impressive. On the flanks they had two...
Goalkeeper Taffarel, organizing his defenders: again his talent sparkled in penalty shoot-outs (parrying two penalties in the semifinal against the Netherlands), as it had done four years previously in the 1994 World Cup.

Cesar Sampaio (5) netted the first goal of the World Cup in the game against Scotland. Altogether the defending midfielder found the net three times, all of which resulted from set pieces.

Ronaldo (9, page 74) shimmies around the Scotsman, Hendry. Although he failed to score in the opening match, he ended up as his squad’s top goal scorer with four goals (including a penalty) to his credit.
outstanding players in Roberto Carlos (left) and Cafu (right), though both were better in going forward than in defending. Both were fast and skilful, both could hit accurate passes and in addition Roberto Carlos had a powerful shot. However their sprints down the wing left holes at the back, and these were not always blocked off well enough, neither by the midfielders nor by their defensive colleagues. Sharp counter-attacking teams like Denmark, Norway and Holland too were able to take advantage of these gaps.

Compared to 1994, Dunga took on a different role. He went into the position that Mauro Silva had occupied, that of «windscreen wiper» in front of the defence. He was the undisputed boss of the team, directing, criticizing and motivating his team mates. Cesar Sampaio played in the other defensive midfield position and oddly enough he was second highest goalscorer with 3 successes (all following set pieces), only just behind Ronaldo with 4, and level with Rivaldo and Bebeto. In the attacking part of midfield it was Rivaldo who was in charge, offering service to Ronaldo and Bebeto up front as well as using his deadly charge, offering service to the attacking part of midfield with Rivaldo and Bebeto. In parallel to Rivaldo on the left, there was Leonardo on the right. After a disappointing season with AC Milan, he improved from game to game and was the ideal complement in this area.

The two strikers were Ronaldo and Bebeto. While Ronaldo would often drop back into midfield and then use his speed off the mark and his dribbling ability to penetrate, Bebeto remained up front, ready to pounce at the right moment. Ronaldo was also more prepared to get involved in tackles and to challenge for possession if the ball had been lost.

Compared to 1994, this Brazilian side was of a more homogeneous standard. This can be seen in one respect in that four years ago the two strikers (then Romario and Bebeto) were serviced almost exclusively with long balls, with the expectation that these two exceptional players would be able to make something out of the situation. This time there was more play through midfield. In Dunga and Rivaldo they had two playmakers to get the rest of the team into the action. While it is true that there were not more names on the list of scorers in 1998 (four, as against five in 1994) this time they all got roughly the same share of the goals (Ronaldo 4, Cesar Sampaio, Rivaldo and Bebeto 3 each). Last time Romario (5) and Bebeto (3) had got the lion’s share with the three other players on one apiece.

Attacking down the flanks was an important part of Brazil’s strategy, with Roberto Carlos and Cafu, the two wing backs, being very effective in this role. Both could hit accurate passes on the run and this meant trouble for any opposing defence.

Brazil’s style has gone more from the romantic towards the pragmatic. This trend was noticeable in 1994 and it was more pronounced this time. The current realistic, efficient system offers fewer moments of magic, and this would not get an overwhelmingly positive vote from the fans — what they really want to see is swashbuckling attacking play.

With all the individual talent available, Brazil were still a compact team unit. In a strong all-round side, Dunga played a key role: whenever the team was faced with a problem he would be the one to take the initiative and get things moving positively again.

The team had problems when they were behind, and they found themselves in this unusual position against Norway, Denmark and France. And it was only against the Danes that they managed to come back and win the game. Their defence was a problem too; the two central defenders looked a bit slow, were not always clever in their positional play and did not seem to be in top form in terms of fitness either. Particularly in the final against France they were outpaced several times or by-passed with some sharp passing. But they alone cannot be held responsible for the defeat. The whole team was off the boil that evening and never reached their customary level. The Brazilian Association and the team’s officials will certainly investigate very closely.

Maria Lobo
ZAGALLO
9.8.1931

Career as a player:
1953–1955 Flamengo
1961–1963 Botafogo
1967–1969 Botafogo
1971 Flamengo
1978–1979 Kuwait national team
1980 Vasco da Gama
1981–1984 Saudi Arabia national team
1984 Flamengo
1989–1990 UAE national team
1994 Brazil national team

Career as a coach:
1961–1962 Botafogo
1967–1969 Botafogo
1971 Flamengo
1978–1979 Kuwait national team
1980 Vasco da Gama
1981–1984 Saudi Arabia national team
1984 Flamengo
1989–1990 UAE national team
1994 Brazil national team

Successes (as a player):
1958–1962 World Champion
1970 World Champions Brazil
1994 World Champions Brazil (Assistant coach)
1997 Winners of the Copa America
1997 Winners of the FIFA/Confederations Cup

Successes (as a coach):
1961–1962 World Champion
1970 World Champions Brazil
1994 World Champions Brazil (Assistant coach)
1997 Winners of the Copa America
1997 Winners of the FIFA/Confederations Cup
Chile

This was the first time that Chile had qualified for a World Cup final round since 1982. For a long time it looked uncertain as to whether they would make it or not, but finally two comfortable wins over Peru and Bolivia earned them their tickets to France. This success is related to the continuous development work that has been done in Chilean football. A lot of work has been done at the junior level, and Chile’s appearances in the last U-20 and U-17 world championships were among the rewards for their efforts. Although these young teams were not very successful, a number of talented players have come through and this gives the association cause to be optimistic for the future.

Their preparation for France was carried out in several stages. Following three short training sessions in Chile they undertook a 17-day trip to Asia, Oceania and Europe, during which they played 6 friendly matches. Before they finally flew off to France, coach Acosta had his team together from 8–13 May 1998 in Coquimbo, at the Complejo Deportivo Puerto Velero.

Their three group games all ended in draws, although victory in one or more of these games would have been possible. A lack of concentration late in the game (particularly against Austria, who were allowed to equalize in stoppage time) meant that their qualification for the second round (for the first time since 1962) remained uncertain until the very last moment.

Then, in the second round they were quite hopeful of upsetting Brazil. But three goals following standard situations settled their fate before half time. Before that they had started well, keeping possession of the ball and creating several good chances.

Their 3-5-2 was interpreted flexibly. Libero Fuentes always played behind the two stoppers who used zone marking to keep their opponents in check. The defenders were hardly ever seen in an attacking move. In midfield, the two flank players Rojas (left) and Villarroel (right) helped out equally in attack and defence. In the middle of the park, Acuna took on the role of team leader.

Nelson Parraguez (7) was one of three players suspended from the Chilean team in the quarter final, considerably weakening their firing power.
organizer, supported by the strong tackling Parraguez. Estay (or Sierra) played behind the two strikers, Zamorano and Salas and completed this part of the team.

Chile’s strengths lay in their good organization, their tactical discipline, their compactness and in the individual skills of practically every player. A special mention must be made of the two strikers; Zamorano was the ideal provider for Salas who scored four goals. These two managed to turn a number of forward moves into real scoring opportunities.

Among the weaknesses of the team must be mentioned their lack of physical fitness. The results of this were a drop in performance during the second half in each of their group games, leading to goals being conceded late on, as mentioned above. Against set pieces their defensive organization was less than fully effective (two goals conceded following free kicks against Brazil). In addition, they lost possession too often in midfield and this gave the defence extra work to cope with.

But having succeeded in reaching the finals after an absence of 16 years, they went on to attain a place in the second round for the first time in 36 years. No-one really expected them to defeat Brazil in the next match and so their minimum realistic aim had been achieved. If their association continues to work at developing the game then they can raise their ambitions a notch or two higher for the future.

It was anything but easy for captain Ivan Zamorano (9) in the second round game versus Brazil. Here he is seen pitting himself against Roberto Carlos.

| Career as a player: | 1969–1971 | Huracán Buceo (Uruguay) |
| | 1972–1976 | Peñarol (Uruguay) |
| | 1977 | Everton (Chile) |
| | 1978–1981 | Peñarol (Uruguay) |
| | 1981–1983 | Ferencváros (Hungary) |
| Career as a coach: | 1984–1987 | Peñarol (Uruguay) |
| | 1992 | Cruz Azul (Mexico) |
| | 1993–1996 | Unión Española |
| | 1996– | National team of Chile |

Successes: (as a player) 1973–1975 Triple champion with Peñarol (Uruguay)
By qualifying for the World Cup finals, Croatia achieved their second notable success since the country became a member of FIFA in 1992. And this time, hoping to improve on their performance at EURO 96, the players had ambitions of doing more than just reaching the quarterfinals. In Miroslav Blazevic they had a coach with well respected credentials. Blazevic was optimistic that his team could have a good run in this tournament. He based this positive outlook on the range of talent he had available and the national pride that players and coaching staff would have in representing their country in France. 14 of his 22 players, and 9 of the starting line-up, were engaged outside Croatia (England, Italy, Spain and Germany). There was no shortage of international experience, without which it is difficult to succeed at the top level.

Most of their preparation was carried out at home in Porec. Blazevic assembled a group of 25 players there on 23 May, prior to announcing his final selection on 5 June. They played 6 friendly matches against relatively weak opposition. The easy wins they earned were not much of a surprise, but a few eyebrows were raised when they lost 1:2 against Slovakia. But in retrospect, losing that game was not a bad thing to happen to them.

Their tournament began according to the book. Starting off with two wins (Jamaica 3:1 and Japan 1:0) they were assured of a place in the second round. Argentina seemed more motivated for the final group game (hoping to avoid another meeting with Romania in the next round, after the USA encounter with this opponent), and this perhaps was the reason why Croatia did not come through the group matches undefeated.

Second place in the group set them up for a meeting with Romania of course, and a penalty from Suker just before halftime proved to be the decider in this game, although with more concentration in front of goal they could have made the margin wider. Then against Germany in the quarterfinal they exacted revenge for their defeat at EURO 96, thanks to their efficient counter-attacking tactics. This win put them among the last four, and against France they took a 1.0 lead, giving them perhaps brief hopes of a place in the final, but the French equalized almost in the next move. They finally earned bronze medals, thanks again to their brilliant counters and an optimal utilization of chances, plus what was probably goalkeeper Ladic's best performance at the tournament. The 2:1 victory over Holland was duly celebrated as the greatest success in the young association's history. They used man-marking around their own penalty area and zone-marking in defensive midfield, where they concentrated on holding the centre of the pitch. With Stimac as libero they used Bilic and Simic as man-markers, while Soldo as their defensive midfielder took care of the opposition's playmaker (Hassler for example in the match against Germany). Neither Stimac nor Soldo took much part in attacking moves. In midfield they had Stanić (right) and Jarni (left) on the flanks, both of whom had defensive as well as attacking responsibilities. In midfield it was Boban and Asanovic who provided the creative impulses. The midfield block was compact, disciplined in their defensive duties and provided pace.
Two players largely responsible for Croatia's surprise capture of the bronze medals: captain and midfield playmaker Zvonimir Boban (10) and top goal scorer Davor Suker (9).
and ideas for the team’s attacks. Croatia were at their best when they were allowed to use their counter-attacking skills. If they could intercept an opponent’s attack in their own half, they would send their two superb strikers Suker and Vlaovic away. Vlaovic had plenty of pace and lots of tricks, while Suker had excellent dribbling skills, fine ball control and the talent for being in the right place at the right time – always a threat near the opponent’s goal. The two flank midfielders, Jarni and Stanic offered strong support with their forceful runs, while in the middle Boban and Asanovic provided accurate and dangerous through passes for the strikers.

Coach Blazevic was clear about his team formation from the very beginning. He made hardly any changes to the side and only used 14 players on a regular basis. This could be due to the fact that there was a gap between the quality of players 1–14 and 15–22, but it is more likely that the 14 players used were those that best fitted the coach’s concept and that he would only use others in case of injury.

The strengths of the team began at the back with the four-man defensive block (all strong headers). Here they used one libero behind and another in front of the two central defenders. In midfield they had the skills of Boban and Asanovic, while up front Suker was capable of turning a game by himself. Add to this the strength of Stanic and Jarni on the flanks and a powerful team emerges. Their counter-attacking play was their trump card, backed up by their team spirit and the pride they displayed in playing for Croatia. Prosinecki seemed to be a bit lacking in these qualities (in the coach’s view at least), otherwise it is hard to explain why a player with his talent would only be used sporadically, especially during decisive phases of the tournament. Goalkeeper Ladic too deserves a mention. Against Germany, and later against Holland in the 3rd place play-off, he saved the team a goal or two with his lightning reactions.

In general the team did not defend compactly enough. While they were sound in the middle, opponents often seemed to find space to penetrate down the wings. The team was also not capable of dictating the course of a match. Anything other than counter-attacking was not their style. France took very little time to come back after being 0:1 down, and Holland were allowed to equalize too although it took a little longer.

But despite this list of weaknesses, Croatia were the big surprise of the tournament. From the start it was known that they had some exceptional talent available, such as Suker, Boban and Asanovic, but that they would harmonize so well as a team was a complete surprise. Coach Blazevic could even allow himself the luxury of leaving a player like Prosinecki on the bench for three matches in a row. Why the trainer only brought on the former European Cup winner just one minute before time in the semifinal, following Boban’s departure, is a question that is hard to answer.

Croatia’s manager, Miroslav Blazevic was justified in feeling happy with his team’s performance.

Career as a player: 1954– FC Dinamo Zagreb, Rijeka, Sion (Switzerland), Vevey

Career as a coach: Vevey, Sion, Lausanne (Switzerland), Rijeka, Zagreb (Croatia), Grasshoppers (Switzerland), Nantes (France), PAOK (Greece)

National team:

Swiss national team
National team of Croatia

Successes (as a player) 1954 National champion with Dinamo Zagreb
National championship and cup competition in Switzerland
National champion and cup competition winner with Dinamo Zagreb
they had done in the group games. Instead their defensive bulwark was set up well before their own penalty area so that the Nigerians could find neither time nor space to build up a careful attack. In tackling, the Danes were the equal of any opponent that came along.

One of their specialties was the quick execution of free kicks. They achieved two successes in this way (one was against France when the move led to the awarding of a penalty) and the other the 1-0 opener against Brazil. They made good use of their chances (Brian Laudrup), had several players with good shooting skills (both Laudrups and Møller), plus excellent tactical understanding and lots of experience. Not surprising, since many of their players are engaged by clubs in Europe’s top leagues. Goalkeeper Schmeichel, dominant and safe himself, directed the defence well. He and the defensive boss Høgh, plus Jørgensen on the right in midfield (doing lots of running and making himself valuable both in defence and in attack), were among the best in the team. The Laudrup brothers had a great tournament, Michael with his wonderful overview, Brian a master dribbler and a deadly finisher. Møller and Sand, the two strikers also deserve a mention; they were used as alternates, but immediately integrated. Johansson also showed a fine touch with his substitutions (Sand and Møller both came on and scored).

No fewer than eight Danish players got their names on the list of scorers. This made it hard to predict where the danger would come from, although many of the moves went through one or other of the Laudrups.

What caused them some trouble was when they had to dictate the pattern of a game themselves, as was the case in the first two group games, against South Africa and Saudi Arabia. Too much was then left to the Laudrups to do and they were held in check by the opposing defence. This lead to a lack of creativity up front since there was not enough support coming from behind.

Coach Johansson’s achievement was to get the best out of the team. After the group games no one would have expected such a positive performance against Nigeria and certainly not against Brazil. Although they were among the older teams in France, with an average age of 29 years and 3 months, they improved as the competition went on and were certainly one of the positive surprises.
In 1990 England had not been far away from winning a medal in Italy, but four years later they failed even to qualify for the tournament in the USA. This time the World Cup winners of 1966 were expected to come closer to repeating their great success — at least by the members of the association, who continued to put their faith in Glenn Hoddle after the team's unlucky elimination by Germany in the semifinal of EURO 96.

Their preparation consisted of three phases: a week at home was followed by a week in Spain, and then on 3 June Hoddle's chosen 22 were assembled at home again for another week. The short trip to France was left until just a week before their first World Cup match.

The team came to France with serious ambitions. Hoddle had chosen an ideal mixture, some of the players very young, others seasoned by years of international campaigning.

Yet there are always critical voices ready to disagree with whatever choices are made. But the group games, while not overwhelmingly positive from a results point of view — 2:0 win over Tunisia, 1:2 defeat against Romania, 2:0 win over Colombia — showed clearly what potential there was in this team. Their elimination in the second round, in what was one of the best matches of the whole tournament, was due less to a drop in performance than to the luck that can make or break a team in a knockout competition. Beckham's being sent off for a momentary lack of control, Campbell's (rightfully) disallowed goal with the score at 2:2, and then defeat on penalties after 120 minutes of play — this was a sequence of events that meant that not the poorer team had lost, just the unluckier one.

As noted above, the squad contained a blend of young and old, and after two disappointing performances from Sheringham, the young Michael Owen was given a chance to prove himself. Just a year earlier in 1997 he had been with the youth team in Malaysia, now here he was seizing his big opportunity and scoring two goals in as many games, one of them the magnificent solo effort that gave England a 2:1 lead against Argentina. The unlucky Beckham is only 23, Gary Neville and Paul Scholes not much older.

England used a classic 3-5-2 system with the very experienced Tony Adams as a steadfast libero, Gary Neville (in the first match Southgate) and Campbell in the defence. All three of these players would go forward when given the chance. Defensive midfielder Ince offered support at the back, but also was the starting point for attacking moves.

The other two midfielders, Scholes and Beckham were both geared towards attack, although the latter's place was taken by the defensive Batty against Tunisia and Romania. They were individually strong, had a good eye for the state of the game and could hit clever long passes. On the flanks in midfield were Anderton (right) and Le Saux, who generated a lot of pressure down the wings but did not neglect their defensive duties.

In attack Shearer and Owen were constantly on the move, with Owen more prepared to go back and get the ball himself from midfield, while Shearer was the typical goalmouth striker.

England were a side that had to make the running. They always tried to be the active team and to get the opponent to play at their
Not yet 20 and already a bright star sparkling in the English firmament: Michael Owen.

Sol Campbell in a clinch with Gabriel Batistuta. It was bad luck for him that his goal for 3-2 against Argentina was disallowed because a foul had been committed seconds before.
pace. They were well organized and always dangerous, thanks to the quality of the midfielders and the forwards, backed up by the surprising and unpredictable forwards surges of the defenders.

Traditionally English players are strong in the air, and such was the case with this team too, both in defence and in attack.

The team also showed tactical discipline and good organization, both in defence and in attack. They were united in their efforts and determined to win; they thought as a team, and both the players and the team’s officials were always fair in their words and deeds (despite Beckham’s red card). It was no accident that they won the Fair Play prize (jointly with France).

No serious weaknesses were to be seen in this team. Perhaps they were not always scrupulous in their tackling, especially near the penalty area, and did not look too secure against some free kicks (especially the one that led to Argentina’s 2:2 equalizer).

Overall, Hoddle is to be congratulated for his courage in using all these young players in the World Cup. This is a team with a future; they will be a force to reckon with in the next major international competitions.

Paul Scholes curving in a long shot for 2-0 against Tunisia: at the tender age of 24, he is another player regarded as a future rocket in the English regiment.
The last big triumph achieved by the French national football team dates back to 1984, when they won the European Championship, which they hosted that year. 14 years later they were again the hosts for a major competition, and their fans were full of hope of once more winning the title, this time the World Cup.

The French association is known for the emphasis it places on the development of youth football, and their recent successes at the U-18 level (European champions 1996 and 1997) were among the rewards for their efforts. However, it has taken the FFF a long time to come up with a national team that would match the one from the golden era of Platini, Giresse, Tigna and Rocheteau. They had not in fact succeeded in reaching the final round of a World Cup since 1986, and their first return to the international scene was at EURO 96, where they failed to reach the target they had set themselves (losing on penalties against the Czech Republic in the semi-finals).

But in 1998 things would all be different. Aimé Jacquet and the FFF analysed the team’s performances before and during EURO 96 very carefully and tried to make plans that would avoid committing the same mistakes again. First step was to increase the number of coaching staff (adding assistant coaches, goalkeeper trainer, etc.) and then defining everyone’s role more precisely. Jacquet stressed the importance of choosing eleven strong substitute players and making sure they would be ready to take their place in the first team. Finally he put a lot of effort into improving the players’ physical and mental condition, an important factor in view of the fact that the tournament would last for more than 4 weeks.

Their team’s immediate preparation for the competition took place in four stages. They had a regeneration session after the long season, in the mountains near Tignes from 11 to 16 May. Then they got back to some physical workouts in a second training camp at the FFF Training Centre in Clairefontaine (18-25 May). The team’s harmony in playing together was honed in a tournament in Morocco (matches against Belgium and Morocco) as well as another game in Finland. Then they returned to Clairefontaine to go over the fine details of their tactical plan (from 8 June until their first match on 12 June). They kept Clairefontaine as their headquarters during the whole tournament.

They played positive (i.e. attacking) football of a very high standard. In the centre of the defence they had Desailly and Blanc, both strong in the air and on the ground. They alternated in going forward with attacks (Blanc getting the Golden Goal against Paraguay in the second round on one of his forward expeditions). Both Lizarazu (left) and Thuram made surging runs down the wings to provide extra width for attacks, both delivering good crosses and Thuram going for goal himself when he saw an opportunity. Captain Deschamps was aided by Petit in organising the defensive part of midfield, while Karembeu (or Henry) and Zidane were responsible for the creative elements in
He was more than a mere alternative to the frequently injured forwards, Guivarc’h and Dugarry: 21-year-old Thierry Henry.

Captain Didier Deschamps (here clashing with Bebeto (20) and Cesar Sampaio from Brazil) ruled as silent and as solid as a rock defending his midfield.

Central defender Laurent Blanc scored the golden goal in the second round match against Paraguay on behalf of his forwards, who had been struggling to find the net for 24 minutes of extra time.
Fabien Barthez was voted into the World Cup All-Star Team – and rightly so – alongside Zinedine Zidane (10), the wheeler and dealer in the French squad.
Germany

Having won the European title in 1996, Germany were reckoned among the favourites for winning the World Cup. The relatively high average age (at over 30 it was the highest of all the teams present) caused some speculation, but the general opinion was that the traditional German virtues, plus the vast amount of experience within the team, would see them once again in among the close contenders for the title.

Coach Berti Vogts announced his 22-man selection on 18 May. They were assembled for a short training session in Finland, plus training camps directly before playing friendly matches against Colombia and Luxembourg. They arrived in their headquarters in the south of France on 7 June.

They came through the group games pretty much as everyone had expected. A comfortable victory over the USA was followed by the first real test, in the form of Yugoslavia. Thanks to gearing up a notch in the second half they came through, but at 2:2 it was a close thing. Then came Iran, and again two goals in the second half, the only ones of the match, earned them another 3 points. As group winners they would go on to meet Mexico in the second round. Some luck, coupled to their unbending spirit, saw them through this match, but they came close to elimination.

Mexico had what amounted to a matchball in the second half, and had they taken this chance, life would have been hard for the Germans. As it turned out, the next match would be the last. Croatia, whom they had defeated on their way to the EURO 96 title, proved to be too much for the overall disappointing Germans. Despite putting on their best performance of the whole tournament, they were beaten 3:0 — a result which was a bit on the high side, and very painful. The verdict on the match was clear: the Germans had been the victims of a classical counter-attacking team, who really dominated the scene in the second half. To explain the defeat as the result of Wörm's expulsion just before half time with the score at 0:0 would be too easy and misleading.

Germany used a traditional 3-5-2 system with at first Olaf Thon and then Lothar Matthäus as libero, usually playing level with or even slightly forward of the two stoppers, Wörm and Kohler (both strong tacklers and good in the air). In midfield Hamann and Jeremies made sure things were safe at the back, while Heintich (right) and Tarnat (or Ziege) played on the flanks and were active both in attack and defence. Häsler was involved in every attacking move and had no defensive duties. At first Vogts played Häsler together with Möller, then Möller without Häsler. Neither plan worked too well, so that in the last matches only Häsler was in the line-up (except for 30 minutes in the second round game against Mexico).

The forward partnership was Bierhoff and Klinsmann in every match.

Most attacks went down the wings, from where either Häsler or one of the two wide midfielders delivered high crosses to the strikers. Both Bierhoff and Klinsmann were very mobile, changing positions frequently and showing excellent positional sense, their reward was three goals apiece. An alternative move would be to attack down the middle, but this was not too successful, especially against teams that were very compact defensively.
Overdoing the aggression in tackling, depending too much on Bierhoff and Klinsmann in attack, and the failure to create many surprises in the build-up of a move were the Germans' weaknesses. It took Vogts a long while to get the best formation together. Players like Thon, Reuter and Möller found less favour as the tournament went on, and they were replaced by Tarnat, Ziege, Harmann and the surprising Matthäus, who had only been called into the squad at the last moment.

Thus the Germans were not able to compensate for their early elimination from the World Cup four years earlier. Their customary strengths, the will to win, physical and mental toughness and discipline, were not enough this time to get them further than the quarterfinal. Some rethinking is necessary; many of the players in France will not be available in the future and a rejuvenation of the team seems inevitable.

Klinsmann (18) and Bierhoff (keeping the Yugoslavian defence busy in the picture) complemented one another superbly in attack, netting together six of the eight goals for Germany.
Cesare Maldini, who has been employed by the Italian association since 1980, partly as assistant trainer to Enzo Bearzot and also as coach of the U-21 national team, was appointed to the position of head coach at a time when the «Squadra azzurra» had already played their first World Cup qualifying matches and were about to face their first real test - an away game in England. A 1:0 victory here got him off to a good start. But things did not continue so well and the Italians eventually had to face a play-off match against Russia before definitely booking their tickets to France.

The direct preparation for France 98 started on 22 May in the association’s training centre in Coverciano. During an 11-day period, they trained twice a day on 5 occasions, underwent medical testing and also played two easy training matches; that was the extent of their build-up for the World Cup. Careful attention was paid to working with the nominated substitute players. Maldini wanted to be sure that in case of need these could be smoothly integrated into the side. Every position was doubled up - the risk of injury or absence for other reasons is very high during such a long tournament.

Italy started off their group games with a libero, two man-markers, two wing backs, three midfielders, one forward lying deep and a striker. After the disappointing opening match against Chile, Maldini made some alterations. Now he kept Costacurta at the back (although he would move forward later to replace the injured Nesta as a man-marker, with Bergomi coming in to take his place) and used three man-markers, (left to right) Nesta/Costacurta, Cannavaro and his son Paolo Maldini. In midfield Di Biagio (replacing the disappointing Di Matteo during the first game) and Dino Baggio were responsible for defensive security. Albertini or Pessotto (left) and Moriero (coming on as a substitute too, for Di Livio) had both offensive and defensive duties, although Moriero was much more to be seen going forward. Further advanced Del Piero played just behind the single striker Vieri.

Gianluca Pagliuca was promoted to permanent goalkeeper after Peruzzi had been injured, justifying his coach’s choice with consistency and competence.
Maldini's system was founded on a strong defence. With the exception of Chile in that opening match, neither Cameroon, Austria (their only goal came from a penalty), Norway or France found a way through this fortification. Up to eight players were involved at times, but this concentration at the back naturally led to a lack of impulse up front. Del Piero did not play up to the expected standard, still appearing not to have recovered full fitness after his injury. Roberto Baggio only came on when Del Piero was not on the field, and while Moriero put in a strong effort on the right he lacked players in free spaces to pass to after he had done some good creative work. Luckily Italy had Vieri in the side; he scored five of the eight goals.

Arrigo Sacchi (World Cup 1994) and Cesare Maldini (1998) have two totally different approaches to the game. While Sacchi favoured an offensive style with pressing, and was prepared to run some risks, Maldini's first priority was safety. His team had to be a goal down before they would go seriously on to the attack. They created very few chances, with their attacking moves largely limited to playing long passes from the defensive midfield area up to the quick and strong-dribbling Vieri. Only when Roberto Baggio came onto the pitch did the Italian team seem different. He brought with him creativity, ideas and imagination. But the coach did not want to play him as well as Del Piero, otherwise he would have been a man short in the defence department.

Experience, tactical discipline and good defensive organization were the strengths of the team, which had some outstanding individuals on view, but their skills were to be sublimated to the good of the team in Maldini's philosophy. Thus they failed to play any spectacular football of the kind that Italian club teams are known for and which one would have expected just reading down a list of all the talented players in the squad.
Mexico

After some disappointing results during the final matches of their qualifying round (at which time they had already earned their qualification for France '98), the Mexican association found themselves under pressure from the media and the fans so that they felt it necessary to take action and replace the coach Bora Milutinovic after a number of years of service. They appointed the relatively little known (certainly unknown in Europe) Manuel Lapuente.

The first opportunity he had to see how his team measured up on the international scene was at the Confederations' Cup in Saudi Arabia in December 1997. They achieved one win (against the host country) and suffered defeats against Australia and Brazil. This was not the strongest possible Mexican team, since Lapuente did not have the services of first choice players such as goalkeeper Campos, Garcia Aspe, Arellano, etc., for one reason or another. The second big test came in the form of the Gold Cup, the Concacaf championship, which Mexico won for the sixth time, defeating the USA in the final.

Their immediate preparations for the World Cup started at the beginning of May when they visited Europe (Italy and France). They played friendly matches against a number of clubs and some national sides, attacking and a 4-3-3 on the defensive. The defenders played in line and used zone marking. The two centre backs (Suárez and Davino) directed the block and coordinated the offside trap, which the team used occasionally. The two wing backs assisted in attacking moves, with only one going forward at a time, guaranteeing at least three men at the back at all times.

In midfield, Garcia Aspe was the dominating figure. A playmaker with a strong left foot, he was able to provide a stream of ideal passes for his team mates. Around him were Ramirez (until his expulsion shortly before the

From left, back row: Ordiales, Pardo, Davino, Campos, Suárez, Lara; front row: Luna, Garcia Aspe, Ramirez, Blanco, Hernández

Mexico’s top goal scorer, Luis Hernandez, was the power behind the goal that put his team ahead of Germany. Not content with that, he soon had another chance of making it 9-0 but failed to finish it off.
end of the match against Holland), Ordiales, Villa, Luna or Palencia. Coach Lapuente did not seem certain which combinations to use and made several changes. They affected the front line too, where Ordiales was sometimes to be found (or Palencia), on the right wing. Whichever one was there was likely to be replaced in the second half, either by Arellano or the joker Pelaez. Blanco was a fixture on the left, as was top scorer Hernandez in the middle.

In attack the Mexicans had their major strength. Their quick inter-passing game (only rarely did they use the long ball) was very effective, as were the numerous attacks down the wings. Whoever was working out on the wings was sure to be quick and tricky and cause trouble for the opponent's defence. The constant interchanging of positions among the three forwards created spaces for advancing midfielders in the centre or for the wing backs down the flanks. Lapuente showed a lucky touch in his use of Pelaez as a substitute. Against Korea and Holland he scored shortly after coming on (getting the 1:1 against Korea and pulling one back against Holland to make it 1:2).

As individuals the players who stood out were goalkeeper Campos, playing the keeper/sweeper role that he enjoys and carries out efficiently, Garcia Aspe in midfield, Hernandez in attack (a fast, spectacular player) and Blanco (very skilful in his play out on the left wing).

But Mexico had trouble when the other team were dictating the play and putting pressure on their defence. Yet paradoxically they played better after they had conceded a goal and were trying to get back on terms than they did when they themselves were in the lead. Against Germany they scored the first goal and then lost the match. In the matches in which they fell behind, they always managed to earn at least a draw. The defence was the weak part of the team in general – not compact enough and liable to take risks near their own box. Another negative factor was the lack of pace on the part of the midfielders.

Mexico acquired the reputation of the come-back kids. In their match against the Netherlands they again burrowed their way back into the game to level the score after being two goals down. Blanco (11) and Hernandez (15) are seen threatening goalie van der Sar and his line of defenders.

Their aim of getting past the second round was not achieved once again. But they played a style of football that was a pleasure to watch and their overall performance augurs well for the future. The quality of their attacking players could bring them greater success, but on the defensive they will have to learn how to hang on to a lead once they have earned one.

Manuel LAPUENTE 15.5.1944
A lot of gossip has circulated about the Dutch team, about who is not speaking to whom, who won't pass to whom, which players won't travel together on the same bus or in the same plane. All rumours that have been welcomed by the press and met with incomprehension by the fans. How would a team like this, counted among the close favourites, actually perform in the battle for the World Cup? Their preparation consisted of several phases. From 7 to 18 May a squad of 25 players (without Davids and Seedorf, who were still engaged in the Champions' League) travelled to Florida (USA). Then they returned to Europe for a short spell in Switzerland. Shortly after this, coach Gus Hiddink announced his definite 22-man selection during a final session in Holland.

Their preparatory matches seemed to be a very good omen, with two 5:1 wins over Paraguay and Nigeria, both World Cup participants themselves. While such victories cannot be relied upon too heavily as a guide to form they were a morale booster for both the Dutch team and their fans.

Their first opponents were arch-rivals Belgium. The «Red Devils» were aiming for nothing more than a goalless draw, and their defensive tactics posed problems for the «Oranjes». The situation became worse when Kuivert was sent off for attacking another player, and earned a two-match suspension. But the team pulled itself together for the next match and demolished Korea. Then they set the seal on their qualification for the second round with a 2:2 against Mexico (only a draw, despite having been 2:0 ahead at one stage). The victory over Yugoslavia was clearer than the score would indicate, but they had a bit of luck here when Mijatovic hit the bar with the score at 1:1. The hardest test so far would come with Argentina in the quarterfinal. This was a rousing game, with a dramatic finish when Bergkamp scored a masterful goal following a long pass from Frank de Boer. Then came 120 minutes of battle against Brazil which ended in defeat at the penalty-shooting stage. After this disappointment, they were unable to motivate themselves fully for the 3rd place play-off against Croatia and ended up conceding the bronze medals to the Eastern Europeans.

Holland were certainly one of the most attractive teams at this World Cup. They had a clear structure in their play, based on the method that has been taught in Dutch clubs and teams for the last 25 years. While players have become more versatile over the years the Dutch philosophy has remained the same. Their players seem to love football. It never ceases to amaze how well young players immediately integrate into an established team. This time it was the barely 22 year-old Zenden who was introduced and immediately showed his class, especially with his super goal against Croatia. Their 4-3-3 line-up was flexibly interpreted, becoming a 4-4-2 when they lost possession, by means of one of the three forwards dropping back into midfield. On the attack, one of the outer backs would move forward into midfield, in an attempt to achieve superiority in numbers. Frank De Boer and Stam alternated in going up to join in an attack. In midfield Hiddink tried at first to manage without Davids but he saw that he would not get far with that plan. Davids became the dominating figure.
Marc Overmars streaked down the left wing like lightning. After suffering from injury in the second part of the championship, he found his way back into the team only occasionally (and always whenever the squad was lagging behind or the attack was lame).

In a strong collective side, he was supported by the versatile Cocu (capable of playing just as well as a wing back or a forward) and by the two other midfielders, Jonk and Ronald De Boer. In the front line Bergkamp (although he did not start off in the first game in order to let an injury heal fully) and Kluivert (or Cocu) became the regulars in the course of the tournament. Overmars played on the right and on the left wings, and his pace brought a lot of danger into the Dutch attack.

A major strength of the team was its homogeneity.

Points of excellence in the team were the accurate, well-timed and often surprising passes from the De Boers, plus the play of Davids and Overmars who were often just that fraction faster than their opponents. The forwards were constantly interchanging their positions in order to create room for players coming through. The Dutch often seemed to play the ball into an apparently crowded area, but then used a one-two or a triangle combination to create a space for somebody. They made great use of the length and the breadth of the field, with Overmars and Ronald De Boer a constant threat on the flanks.

Yet with all this individual talent it was the team that came first. Collective play was the main feature of their performance, and there was no sign of any of the earlier dissent that had been talked about so much. The tactical plan the coach had formulated was followed carefully. The players on the bench were of top quality, with names like Aron Winter and

Guus Hiddink
8.11.1946

Career as a player:
1970–1971 PSV Eindhoven
1976 Washington Diplomats (USA)
1977 San José (USA)
1978–1981 Nijmegen

Career as a coach:
1986–1990 PSV Eindhoven
1990–1991 Fenerbahce Istanbul (Turkey)
1991–1994 Valencia (Spain)
1995–1998 Dutch national coach

Successes (as a coach):
1988 UEFA Champion cup with PSV Eindhoven
1986–1989 Four times Dutch champion with PSV Eindhoven
1988–1990 Three times Dutch cup winner with PSV Eindhoven

Champions’ League winner Clarence Seedorf only getting the occasional chance.

It was interesting to observe how closely linked to a game coach Guus Hiddink and his assistants ran their training sessions. It was always clear to see how an exercise related to a match situation.

The lack of creativity apparent in the first game proved to be a bit of a puzzle. Probably the reason is that both teams know each other so well, having been drawn together in countless competitions. But Holland seemed to be vulnerable to the quick counter-attack. Against Croatia the two goals they conceded were achieved with only a couple of passes.

Holland have never enjoyed the greatest luck at major football championships. Their only appearances in World Cup finals ended in defeat, 1974 in Germany and 1978 in Argentina, both times against the home country. But during these tournaments they had been the team which had put on the best performances during all the previous games in the competition. So after a longish spell without success, 1998 seemed to offer them a chance of glory at last. Sadly, the lucky colour this time was not orange either, and history continues to record their missed opportunities.
Three players who were equally responsible for the Dutch team’s attractive game: despite initial injury, Dennis Bergkamp (above) turned out to be his squad’s top goal scorer; Patrick Kluivert (above, left) steadily lifted his game in the second part of the tournament and Edgar Davids (left) grew into the role of the artful dodger.
Nigeria came to France as the great hope of African football. As two-times African champions (1980 and 1994) and Olympic champions in 1996 they arrived with a good record. Would they be the first African country to win the World Cup itself? But, unfortunately, there seems to be a trend that is developing in Africa, as well as in other continents, that the coach is replaced after qualification for the World Cup has been secured. That changing trainers is also going to mean changing the team’s playing system, their tactics, etc., is somehow not seen as part of the picture. But Nigeria followed this fashion. Of course the country still has a wealth of individual talent available (most of them graduating from the victorious Olympic team), but they did not have much time to adapt to the style of play that new coach Bora Milutinovic planned for them and there was quite a bit of criticism during the build-up to the World Cup when a number of friendly matches ended with very unpromising scorelines.

In addition, Nigeria were drawn in the strongest-looking of all the eight groups. Spain, Paraguay and Bulgaria would be their three opponents. While the Africans were still counted among the favourites for the title, it was a bit of a surprise when they beat Spain in their opening match. Twice they were a goal behind and having caught up to 2:2, a magnificent drive from Oliseh won them the game. Yet they had found it difficult to get the rhythm of their own game started. The automatic understanding that a well-tuned team shows was missing, and they were not a compact unit at all in the first half. But they improved after the interval to earn the three points. Against Bulgaria in the next match a problem in their play became apparent, one that would eventually cost them dearly, and that was an over-confidence verging on arrogance. True they did (just) beat the Bulgarians who had finished 4th in 1994, but they never showed the style that would indicate they were going to go a long way in this tournament. In the last group game against Paraguay, Milutinovic made a number of substitutions for a variety of reasons, and it was no surprise that they lost this encounter 1:3 against a team still having to fight for a place in the next round.

Now they had to face Denmark, but instead of concentrating on this game they were already talking about the one after that which would be against Brazil. But they never got that far since the Danes had the right answer to Nigeria’s imagined superiority, and hardly had the game begun before it was decided. Playing as a real team and making efficient use of their chances the Europeans made the African team look quite second rate.

Obviously one of their problems was the late replacement of the coach. The new man basically had too little time to get the players fully adjusted to the style of play he wanted. Another was that they seemed simply to behave like 22 individuals, more concerned with their own careers than with putting their skills at the disposal of the team. They appeared to have overlooked the point that when a team is successful the players in it will be seen in a positive light too. The third and perhaps most critical problem was the over-blown expectations of all concerned. Talk was always about being in the final or at least the semifinal; little was heard about how they would actually get that far.
Kanu’s big chance to revive Nigeria in the game against Denmark: sabotaged by Schmeichel’s brilliant reaction.

A rundown of some of their individual performances – goalkeeper Rufai never reached the level that had made him one of the best keepers in 1994. He seemed unsure in his actions both on the line and coming out into the penalty area. In the four-man defensive block, West and Uche alternated as libero, both of them strong in the air and both powerful in going forward. As wing backs they had Adepoju (right) and Babayaro doing both defensive and offensive work. In midfield two players stood out – Oliseh was the rearmost of the two, directing and organizing at the back, while Okocha was the playmaker and practically every dangerous forward move saw him involved. Oliseh had a hard powerful shot (see the third goal against Spain) while Okocha was a wonderful dribbler and also liked to shoot, but he was not as successful.

With two talented wide midfielders, Finidi (right) and Lawal, the option of attacking down the flanks was frequently chosen. In four games over 60 crosses were played into the centre (not counting corners), with two of them leading to goals. Of the forwards only Ikpeba commanded a regular place. His usual partner Amokachi was injured at the beginning, Kanu only came on as the tournament progressed and Yekini was used as a joker.

Okocha, Oliseh, Adepoju and the two central defenders West and Uche were the strongest players during this tournament. It was mostly due to them that the team at least had phases in which they looked a very capable side.

Nigeria will have to give some thought to the future. Talent alone is not sufficient at the highest level. Their new coach must be given time to build up a team that can be guided slowly towards the apes of world football. Short term solutions will not enable the association to realise its objectives.

Career as a player:
1963–1968 Partizan Belgrade
1969–1972 AS Monaco, Nice, Rouen (France) and Winterthur (Switzerland)
1972–1977 UNAM Pumas (Mexico)

Career as a coach:
1977–1984 UNAM Pumas (Mexico)
1984–1986 Mexican national team
1984–1986 Udinese (Italy)
1987–1988 San Lorenzo
1988–1989 Guadalajara
1989–1990 Venecia
1990 Costa Rican national team
1991–1994 US national team
1995–1997 Mexican national team
1998 Nigerian national team

Successes (as a player):
Six times league champion with Partizan Belgrade
Twice league champion with UNAM (Mexico)
Twice CONCACAF champions’ cup winner with UNAM (Mexico)
on the left being the more active of the two. When Tore Andre Flo roamed out to the wings, Leonhardsen and Mykland (or Strand) would come through down the middle.

The Norwegians' strongest point, in both defence and attack, was their heading. Their shooting was not as dangerous. Only Tore Andre Flo and Riseth did much dribbling. The team's overall organization, their tactical discipline and their physical condition were all impressive. It was clear who had been assigned what role and each player knew exactly what he had to do. Their style of play was geared to the talents of the players available and relied a lot on quick counter attacks. They were also efficient in their utilisation of set pieces. In this respect, Morocco were on the receiving end of some well-practised moves, twice conceding goals to free kicks from the edge of the penalty area which were played high into the middle.

Their attacks were not all that creative and tended to be stereotyped, and not all the players had skills of the highest international standard. Against long balls played from a deep position and also against quick interpassing moves, the defence did not look totally secure.

The most impressive players in the team were wing back Bjørnebye with his variety of passing (also during set pieces), playmaker Rekdal with his good ball skills, and Tore Andre Flo, very determined and hard to dispossess.

Thus Norway achieved the aim that they had set themselves. They came through in a difficult group and then against a defensive Italy they could have fared better. But they stuck with their counter-attacking tactics that time, even after falling behind and that was not enough to see them through.

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| Career as a player | 1958–1974 | Østfold IL, Vålerenga IF, Sarpsborg FK, Fagvand FK |
| Career as a coach | 1979–1979 | Coach of various Norwegian clubs |
|                  | 1979–1985 | Norway U-21 national team |
|                  | 1984     | Norway Olympic team (assistant) |
|                  | 1990     | Norway Olympic team |
|                  | 1990–1998 | Norway national «A» team |

Successes: (as a player) 16 appearances with the Norwegian national «A» team

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Tore Andre Flo (9) was the only official striker in the Norwegian plan of attack. He kicked the crucial equalizer against Brazil, turning the game in Norway's favour and, consequently, opening the door to the second round.
France 98 was Paraguay's first return to the World Cup since 1986. The foundation of this achievement was laid in the early stages of the qualifying round when they went nine games without defeat (7 wins) after an initial loss against Colombia. They actually headed the group for a long time.

Their preparation started with a visit to Japan to take part in the Kirin Cup (16 to 23 May). Then they travelled to Holland (Eindhoven) where they remained until they moved on to France on 7 June. They played a number of warm-up matches, but the results were not good enough to raise any great hopes. In addition they were drawn in what was seen as the toughest group of them all with Bulgaria, Nigeria and Spain.

Their Brazilian coach Paulo Cesar Carpegiani was not disturbed by all this and stated repeatedly that the team had everything to win and nothing to lose. In fact they ended the group games unbeaten, with a goal-line of 3:1, and thus found themselves among the last 16. But there it would be the first-ever Golden Goal in the history of the World Cup that would put them out.

Paraguay based their strategy on a strong defence, which at times contained as many as 7 players (three defenders and four midfielders). With the outstanding Chilavert in goal, Sarabia, Ayala and Gamarra were the three permanent defenders. None of them was really a libero; they concentrated on zone-marking and interchanged positions as necessary. This style of defensive play demands perfect organization and coordination between defence and midfield. But the drawback was that very little offensive drive came from the back.

In general there were 5 players in midfield. The two flank players had a double role to fulfil: a) to close down space on the wings and b) to work with the central midfielders in a zone-marking scheme. Only one of them was active in attacking moves, with the result that in the first two games and in the second round match their attack was practically non-existent. When they did go forward it was either

Jose Luis Chilavert's versatility both in goal and on the field as a leader and motivator made him one of the championship's most memorable personalities.

From left, back row: Arce, Gamarra, Ayala, Chilavert, Sarabia, Cardozo, Acuna, staff member; front row: staff member, Benitez, Brizuela, Paredes, Enciso

José Luis Chilavert's versatility both in goal and on the field as a leader and motivator made him one of the championship's most memorable personalities.
using a short-passing game or via long through passes and high centres. They failed to create any goals via a build-up of their own; the goals that came were either the result of regaining possession thanks to pressing near the opponent's penalty area (the three against Nigeria) or followed a set piece.

Paraguay's game was based on discipline, faultless defensive behaviour and excellent positional play. Cooperation between midfield and defence functioned extremely well. They were also a team with the right mental attitude — ready to work hard and not accept defeat. And in goal they had the exceptional José Luis Chilavert — player, leader, motivator and coach all in one. Their strategy in the knockout game against France was clear — hang on until the penalty shoot-out and there Chilavert would make the difference. He was a truly dominating figure, and a free kick he took against Bulgaria was almost successful. It would not have been his first.

Others who caught the eye were — Benitez in midfield, the only creative player in the team; Arce out on the left in midfield with his long passes and precise centres; central defenders Ayala and Gamarra who were both calm and effective.

Had Paraguay been as strong in attack as in defence they would have been very serious contenders for the title, but they put all their emphasis on preventing the other team from scoring and so their own efforts up front were lacking in ideas and penetration. Carpegiani knew exactly what skills he could count on within his squad and chose his tactics accordingly. By doing so he achieved the maximum possible.
Having struggled for years to find a worthy goalkeeper, Romania came up with a world-class goalie in time for the World Cup: Bogdan Stelea pictured in spectacular action against Vlaovic from Croatia.

Scu at the World Cup in 1994 and at EURO 96. In France he made Stelea his definite first choice, and the keeper justified the selection by showing hardly any uncertainty. Especially in the second round match against Croatia his almost miraculous saves staved off total disaster. In this game the signs that things were not going well that had been seen in the last group match (Tunisia) became more apparent, and Romania went down without much of a fight. Only Stelea offered real resistance.

In addition to the goalkeeper, players who earned high marks were libero Popescu, Petrescu on the right flank, where he did valuable work both in defence and in attack, Hagi of course, and the young Ilie, only 24, who was a clever dribbler and capable of ending a run with a strong shot. His movement off the ball was also a positive feature of his play, and he was a handful for any opposing defence.

The impression they made in their first two group games of being a very talented team was only partly confirmed. Some of the players were indeed above average, but as a team they did not blend together sufficiently. In addition some of them seemed to have trouble keeping up with the physical demands of a tournament like this, and so lapses of concentration crept into their game at times. After their fine start they fell away -- their early qualification for the second round may well not have been without its negative side.

### IORDANESCU
4.5.1950

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<th>Career as a player:</th>
<th>1967–1982</th>
<th>Steaua Bucharest</th>
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<td>1990–1992</td>
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<td>1992–1993</td>
<td>Steaua Bucharest</td>
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<td>1993–1998</td>
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<td>1998–</td>
<td>Greek national A team</td>
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<th>Twice national champion and 4 times cup winner with Steaua Bucharest</th>
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<td>(as a coach) 1985/86</td>
<td>64 appearances in the national A team (as playing asst. coach) European champions clubs' cup with Steaua Bucharest</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986–1993</td>
<td>three national championships and two cup trophies with Steaua</td>
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Savo Milošević shoots past Dooley from the USA towards goal. His reliance on a permanent niche in the team soon gave way to the occasional appearance on the orders of the Yugoslavian coach, Santrac.

Slobodan SANTRAC
17. 1946

Career as a player:
- 1959–1960: Takovo
- 1960–1965: Vlajevo
- 1973–1976: Grasshoppers Zurich (Switzerland)

Career as a coach:
- 1994–: U-21 national team of Yugoslavia
- 1994–: Yugoslav national team

Successes (as a player):
- 1966: Yugoslav cup winner with OFK Beograd
- 1968: Yugoslav champion with OFK Beograd

The Yugoslavian football still had to wait for its next major success. But the emergence of talents like Stankovic and Ognjenovic mean that the wait might not be all that long.

of the two dropping back into midfield when the team lost possession.

All the players had polished technical skills; no problems for them either in controlling the ball or in hitting short or long passes exactly where they wanted them to go. Mijatović and Mihajlovic were skilled marksmen, and the heading of Komljenovic both in defence and in attack was in a special class. The two young players used, Ognjenovic (striker) and Stankovic (midfield), showed their talent when they were given a chance, and at 21 and 20 respectively they look good prospects for the future. Goalkeeper Kralj was sound at the back, confident on the line and in the penalty area. However, his positional play was a little shaky on a few occasions, and these lapses were costly (the first goal against Holland).

This was a promising team with a lot of fine individual players. At the moment they seem to lack the self-confidence and harmony to steer them through difficult patches.
High standards

By Volker Roth (Germany), member of the FIFA Referees' Committee
To keep in step with the increase in the number of teams from 24 to 32, the number of match officials had to go up too. In all 34 referees and 33 assistant referees were invited by FIFA to take part. They were divided among the confederations as follows: AFC 4 referees and 5 assistants, CAF 5/4, Concacaf 3/4, Conmebol 6/5, OFC 1/1 and UEFA 15/14.

With these 67 officials coming from 52 different countries, some problems might have been expected. Differences in character, culture, religion, sporting and political viewpoints, eating and living habits, not to mention language, were all factors that might have led to problems and which had to be considered. That the Referees’ Committee did not once in the course of the tournament have to resort to the slightest disciplinary measure speaks volumes for the behaviour of all concerned. The atmosphere among the group was relaxed and friendly, with no rivalry apparent — in short it was all very sporting.

Some of the credit for this must go to the excellent treatment they received from the Fédération Française de Football (FFF), with Michel Vautrot and Joel Quiniou constantly looking after the welfare of the refereeing group and making sure that their every wish was satisfied. Certainly another factor that contributed to the feeling of well-being within the group was the fact that FIFA had chosen as their headquarters the «Manoir de Gressy». Gressy en France is a small village of some 900 inhabitants to the south of Paris and about 30 km from the Paris Charles de Gaulle airport. There are hardly any shops, just a shopping centre somewhat out of town. This was an ideal spot, located in open countryside, with a river and lots of woods in the vicinity, attractive houses and friendly people in the village — a guarantee for peace and quiet. A better place to prepare for the difficult assignment ahead could hardly be imagined.

The FFF arranged a detailed programme of leisure activities too, and a number of visitors, including the press, came to Gressy to see the site.

A preparatory course for the referees and assistants was held from 22 to 27 March 1998, during which they underwent fitness testing and were given a thorough grounding about their responsibilities by means of lectures from members of the FIFA Referees’ Committee and by participation in discussion groups. The physical limits set, 2 x 50 m in less than 7.5 seconds, 2 x 900 m in less...
than 32 seconds for referees, and 2 x 50 m in less than 7.5 seconds for assistants, were attained by all participants without difficulty. On the Cooper Test (minimum requirement 2700 m in 12 minutes running), the average was 3050 meters, an impressive performance. There was also a basic medical check-up carried out at the French Sport Institute INSEP, and everyone passed this without any problems. A further test of physical fitness on 6 June 1998 showed the whole group still to be in good shape, and this was followed by another short preparatory course which included analysis of some video material and further intensive discussions. With all this behind them, the match officials were more than well prepared for the task ahead of them.

**Match performance**

The main principle to be observed was concentrating on the job. During the entire tournament, a doctor, two trainers and two masseurs were permanently available to look after the refereeing group – all absolute professionals and ready to be called upon at any moment. The excellent cuisine at the «Manoir de Gressy» helped tremendously in terms of diet. As soon as the group games began a video room was set up in house so that the key scenes of each match could be viewed and analysed. On the day following each match discussions were held with the referees who had officiated, or perhaps in cases of general interest with all those available.

In contrast to previous practice, all the members of the FIFA Referees’ Committee were lodged in the «Manoir de Gressy» too, and they travelled with their respective refereeing team to the next venue. This innovation was met with a positive response all round, since discussions just before a match gave added confidence, while analysis just afterwards brought to light not only errors but also the positive points of a performance.

Being chosen to officiate at a World Cup is an absolute high point in the career of a referee or an assistant. They all perform to the very best of their ability, and it is no easy job to deliver the news that most of them will not be needed after the round of the last 16. From then on only 10 referees and 17 assistants remain in the pool. The disappointment at this stage can be deep and this is quite understandable. Every case is studied carefully and the decisions are made in the light of all available knowledge. At no stage was it the case that a referee lost control of a game, but there was criticism on some occasions, justified and otherwise. Different decisions were made from one match to another in similar situations, some referees being thought too harsh, some too generous. Individual mistakes will always occur, but on the whole very few were shown to be of a decisive nature, even with the use of TV replays becoming more and more common. In the 64 matches, there were 250 yellow cards, 4 yellow/red and 18 red. This is a relatively high number but it should not be concluded that this was an unfair tournament. One point that needs careful scrutiny is the emergence of shirt-pulling as a disrupting tactic – this reached a new level at France 98. But what was noticeable, as expected, was that referees who were
firm and consistent from the beginning were the ones who had the fewest problems. The assistant referees were one of the success stories of the tournament: they were observant, focussed on the job, friendly, sporting, and with very few exceptions correct in their decisions. The idea of making this function a specialised one in its own right has proved its worth. The use of beep communicators between officials was a great help, and the electronic board used for substitutions was also used for indicating how much stoppage time would be added on – which meant that both teams were completely aware of the situation, and thus protests were totally avoided.

Public opinion about the refereeing seems to be divided into two camps, but on the whole it can be said that the standard of officiating – viewed objectively – has risen. The level of preparation, performance and post-match analysis have all reached a very high standard, and, as the final showed, the so-called minor football nations have joined the top ranks in this respect – a very encouraging development.

A serious warm-up is also a must for the trio of referees before a match.
Healthy condition

By the FIFA Sports Medical Committee

In many respects, France 98 reached new levels in the history of the World Cup. The highest ever number of participating teams made the organisation disproportionately harder, from the medical as well as from many other points of view. This report was prepared by the members of the Sports Medicine Committee who were present at the tournament.

Organisation

Medical facilities were organized on three levels:
- at the 10 venues
- at each of the teams’ headquarters, where there were doctors from the French Football Federation (FFF)
- at the centres where FIFA/CFO were located, with members of the FIFA Sports Medical Committee working together with doctors from the French Football Federation.

Every team doctor was able to call on support supervised by a doctor from the FFF, before, during and after matches. Specialists were available in many fields, e.g. internal medicine, sports medicine, orthopaedic surgery, ear, nose and throat, stomatology, ophthalmology, radiology, cardiology, as well as podology and oral surgery in cases of emergency.

These services were requested on a number of occasions, especially by the teams that spent a longer period of time in France. In every case an appeal for help was met with appropriate action.

For the possible medical needs of referees and assistants a special plan had been drawn up on 23-27 March, which was put into

The top strikers were often the target of hard and sometimes unfair attacks.
operation for the duration of their stay in France.

At every venue, physiotherapy facilities were available for referees, so that their recuperation between matches would also be optimal.

For members of FIFA's own World Cup staff in France, medical assistance was available at every venue from both FFF doctors and also from members of FIFA's Sports Medicine Committee. In every case of need help was quickly on hand. And in fact there was some need, since at FIFA headquarters in Paris the working environment (non-opening windows, air-conditioning and adverse atmospheric conditions) led to a number of respiratory ailments and conjunctivitis among the already stressed members of staff, requiring medical assistance on a number of occasions.

At other venues too there were occurrences of symptoms such as headaches, insomnia, shoulder-arm problems and muscular tension. In one case unfortunately, a cardiological emergency had to be dealt with.

Looking forward to future world championships and similar competitions, it is essential that sufficient space is available for members of staff and guests in which proper conditions can be guaranteed for doctors to work and their patients to rest and recover.

Doping controls

Before the World Cup began guidelines for doping controls were set up, and the list of banned substances was brought up to date. The team doctors of the participating countries were informed of the Anti-doping Policy in a pre-competition workshop. The regulations were sent to all the national associations involved, and before the first game acknowledgement of and agreement to these regulations was requested from each national association by the President and the General Secretary. By taking this step, FIFA wanted to ensure the officials responsible for each delegation had studied and accepted the conditions contained in these regulations. In this way, possible misunderstandings were avoided right from the start.

The Laboratoire Nationale de Dépistage du Dopage in Paris (Chatenay-Malabry) was designated as the official centre for doping controls. The members of the FIFA Sports Medicine Committee were distributed among the different venues. The doctors designated by the French Ministry of Youth and Sport were responsible for assisting the FIFA doctors in carrying out doping controls, and help was also provided by the FFF, so that for every control the legal responsibility of the FFF and the local organizing committee (CFO) were guaranteed. Cooperation between the members of these different groups ran very smoothly, and the practical side of carrying out testing was simplified by using a standardised procedure. After an average of 8 hours,
Injuries and the number of matches

- the average was 1.65 injuries per game over the 64 matches
- four teams played seven matches and averaged five injuries each
- four teams played five matches and averaged six injuries each
- eight teams played four matches and averaged six injuries each
- sixteen teams played three matches and averaged 3.5 injuries each
- teams that were eliminated after the first round averaged 3.5 injuries each, those who went further in the competition each
- Figure 2 shows the injuries among the 32 teams, with one team having 12 at the top and four teams with four each at the end. The overall average was 3.3 per team.

On the whole the frequency and the seriousness of injuries in this tournament can be described as moderate. What was a surprise was the fact that the number of thigh and head injuries was greater than the number in the ankle region. The knee was the most affected area, with three cases being serious, which averages out to one per 21 games. Twenty percent of the injuries were the result of fouls, a point that must be investigated further.

On average there were 1.65 injuries per match and 3.3 per team.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the analysis of injuries and the promotion of measures that lead to their prevention will continue to be a priority for FIFA and the Sports Medicine Committee; this is a matter whose importance must not be ignored nor under-estimated.

Quick appraisal and treatment on the touchline. On occasion, the teams medical units were subjected to a hard test.
The organisation of security

By Walter Gagg, Director of FIFA Sports Division

The security arrangements for the World Cup in France 1998 moved into totally new dimensions. The provisions of the «Schengen Agreement» regarding the free crossing of borders within Europe led to a unique level of security measures being taken. As we reported back in 1995, the French government appointed a special commission at a very early stage in the planning, whose mandate was to work with the CFO and FIFA to study and analyse all aspects of the security side of the organisation of the World Cup and to produce a feasible plan for their implementation.

What might have been considered as just a routine exercise was quite frequently anything but a straightforward and uncomplicated assignment. Often long and hard negotiations were required to come up with reasonable solutions to some of the problems, that would be acceptable to all parties involved.

Under the leadership of an official from the Ministry of the Interior, meetings involving everyone concerned with the different aspects of security were held in all the venue cities during the months.

The game between Iran and the USA was classified as a particularly high-risk match. The fair behaviour demonstrated by the players spilled over to the spectators with the result that a so-called «high-risk match» was transformed into a footballing feast.
The gates in the security fencing were caused by spectators and Guatemala 1996, where all those involved.

The component parts can only be effectivewhen all through the trials became World Cup drew nearer, the stadium was inaugurated on 28 January 1998 with a match and in the Stade de Franceat Paris, in order to obtain experience under simulated World Cup conditions. In addition there were matches in two other venues, Marseilles, where a gala match was played between a World Team and a representative European side on the occasion of the group draw on 4 December 1997, and in the Stade de France at Saint Denis when the new stadium was inaugurated on 98 January 1998 with a match France versus Spain. As the World Cup drew nearer, the importance of running through these trials became very clear. A security system can only be effective when all the component parts are linked to each other and there is close cooperation between all those involved.

After the dramatic events of Brussels 1985, Sheffield 1969 and Guatemala 1996, where in all three cases fatalities were caused by spectators being crushed to death when the gates in the security fencing could not be opened, FIFA made a world-wide appeal to replace such potentially deadly fencing which was 2 m and more in height with alternative types of barrier that could be climbed in an emergency. The numerous discussions that were held in this connection proved to be largely successful, with only two stadiums (Lens and St. Etienne) finally deciding not to remove all their fencing, and in these two cases it was for financial reasons.

The special training of the unarmed security staff (stadium guards and stewards) required excellent long-term planning. These officials shouldered their responsibilities seriously and effectively, and the result was that during the total of 64 matches no more than half a dozen spectators actually found their way onto the pitch. This was an achievement to be proud of.

But unfortunately, the hooligan element made its presence felt a few times during what was a superb, fair and colourful World Cup competition. Before the England versus Tunisia match in Marseilles there were violent confrontations between some English hooligans, North African youths and the security forces. The result was a number of injuries ranging from light to quite serious and property damage running into the millions; hundreds of arrests were made for disturbance of the peace or assault and the detainees were only released again after interrogation. Even worse were the events in Lens, on the very day that had been designated «Fair Play Day» — 21 June 1998 — before, during and especially after the match between Germany and Yugoslavia. The confrontations between German youths, who had come to France without tickets, and the local police and security forces escalated from hour to hour and culminated in an unprovoked and mindless attack on a gendarme, Daniel Nivel. He was so seriously injured that after being transported to the University Hospital in Lille, he remained there in an artificial coma for 7 weeks. Even though his condition has since improved, it is doubtful whether he will ever regain full use of all his faculties. The German Football Association and the entire population of Germany were deeply moved by this tragic event and throughout the country movements were started to help out in this situation, which reflects very positively on the whole German nation, trying to compensate for the inane actions of the few.

With memories of such tragic events hard to erase, it will be a main task for FIFA in the future to try to prevent such outbreaks of hooliganism. The aim will be to take such steps that violence is finally removed from the football stadium and kept far away from the sporting scene, where it has no place.

The FIFA team responsible for matters of security — Horst R. Schmidt, Cees de Bruin, Ernie Walker and Leon Walker — are an efficient unit with years of experience behind them. Their permanent contacts in all directions which included the writer of this report and extended as far as the CFO director for security matters Dominique Spinossi, and to Georges Querry, the security officer for the Ministry of the Interior, made it possible to deal with the daily problems that arose in an efficient manner, which received a lot of praise from all sides. Every match which was seen as being of special importance, or as likely to be accompanied by a high risk of violence, was analysed on the spot in advance by FIFA's security officials, and precautions were taken after careful consultation with local security agents. With these agencies working together, match day security measures were set up and carefully enforced during the course of the match.

With the exception of Marseilles and Lens, as mentioned above, this World Cup was a success, not only on the sporting side but also in terms of safety and security. For FIFA, security will remain a central point of the organisational programme for any of its football competitions in the future as well.
Is Fair Play realistic?

By Keith Cooper, FIFA Director of Communications

Try as one may to define and to quantify it, Fair Play will always remain largely a subjective notion. There needs to be some kind of consensus found between those of high ethical principles who consider any act of good sportsmanship no more than what should be the norm, and for whom therefore every act of bad sportsmanship or gamesmanship is utterly contemptible. On the other hand, there are the modern realists who maintain that in the fiercely competitive environment of professional sport anything that is not explicitly illegal is permissible, and that gestures of generosity may be admirable but are also a sign of weakness.

If we subscribe to the latter philosophy, then there can be little hope left for the future welfare of the game. But if we adhere too religiously to the former, we are unlikely ever to acknowledge the significance of such gestures as true sportsmen continue to make despite all provocation and incitement to the contrary.

An assessment of the level of Fair Play at France 98 has therefore to be seen in this context of idealism against realism. And not surprisingly on such a premise, the conclusions are twofold.

France 98 reached new heights – or depths – with regard to what is generally referred to as the professional foul: players covertly pulling at shirts, falling over in the pretence of having been fouled, demanding that the referee show a card to an allegedly guilty opponent, feigning injury, and so on. But no matter how much the defenders of such actions may seek to wrap them up in euphemisms, they all amount to one thing: cheating.

Fortunately, commentators in the media and elsewhere have become increasingly ready to call cheating by name. Unfortunately, however, not even the concerted media pressure has had the desired effect of shaming the culprits into refraining or of persuading them to ignore their coaches’ instructions to indulge in the cheating game.

The 21st June 1998 was Fair Play Day – a sign of friendship and mutual respect. The Iran and USA teams get together for a group photo session.
It is more than sobering to hear experienced coaches condone acts of deception, especially when perpetrated by fresh young players, and even praise their charges for their «professionalism» or their «craftiness». And how often do these same coaches and players then, in the same breath, castigate the referee for being taken in by the same kind of trick executed by their opponents!

If this was the least savoury feature of France 98, and one that FIFA is resolved to act quickly and effectively to expunge, then behaviour of the other extreme may, mercifully, be regarded as one of the most gratifying characteristics of the tournament.

Those who may have wondered if the joyous atmosphere that surrounded the games in the United States in 1994 could be reproduced by a similar «feel-good» factor in France can only have been delighted with what they witnessed in the French stadiums. As four years previously, fans of all nations united in a pageant of colour and noise that bonded them together in the proverbial spirit of fraternity and helped transmit an image of sportsmanship and good humour alongside the matches themselves.

It does not really matter whether the good nature of the fans influences the players or the good nature of the players infects the fans: the end effect is the same. And the rapport between fans and players was at times palpable, the ones encouraging the others to behave, to entertain, and to enjoy.

FIFA's various Fair Play activities also made a major contribution to the positive atmosphere. Peripheral as some of them may appear to have been, together they helped create a feeling where the Fair Play message could no longer be ignored: the distinctive Fair Play flag march-in before each match, the shake-hands between the teams before kick-off, the referee's Fair Play coin to help choose ends, a yellow Fair Play patch on the referee's sleeve, Fair Play logos integrated into the perimeter signage, a Fair Play highlight at the end of every television transmission, and so on.

In complement to the regular repetition of the Fair Play message in these and other ways, FIFA also chose to schedule its second annual World Fair Play Day right in the middle of the tournament. The date selected was 21 June, a natural choice because being a Sunday helped give the theme added exposure worldwide, with four of the six continents known to be represented in the three matches played that day.

One of the matches, by coincidence, was one which had been widely touted in the media as a special confrontation: Iran against the United States, and no matter how much the two sides rightly tried to insist that it was a football match like any other, the inescapable political background gave the encounter an added dimension.

Earlier in the day, the players of Germany and Yugoslavia and then those of Argentina and Jamaica had mingled together in joint pre-match photographs that had been specially prescribed for the occasion. When the Americans and Iranians did the same, before their evening match in Lyon, as well as exchanging gifts, the image of friendship and sportsmanship was carried by television cameras and by popping flashbulbs to all corners of the globe — an immensely effective statement of the power of football to overcome political and cultural barriers.

The spirit of 21 June — Michel Platini's birthday, for good measure — persisted through much of the rest of the tournament. Seldom was it better embodied than by a moment in the France-Italy quarter-final, when Emmanuel Petit deliberately put the ball out of play when in a promising attacking position, because an Italian opponent lay stricken on the turf, needing attention.

Are such gestures losing currency in today's game? Or should they merely be accepted as nothing more than an expression of what sport is really all about?

Regardless of one's philosophy, one can only rejoice in those moments at France 98 when Fair Play really was the name of the game.
France 98 was a competition that will remain firmly in the memories of all those who had the privilege of being present. This was a colourful and eventful tournament and in addition one which did a lot to establish links between people of different nations, as well as showing that French hospitality, which had been viewed rather sceptically from some quarters before the competition started, was up to its reputation. In this respect France and the French people stilled the voices of the critics and pessimists.

Apart from what happened on the pitches, we will remember the fantastic atmospheres in the stadiums, not just in the «Stade de France» in Saint Denis, but also in the fabulous «Velodrome» oval in Marseilles and the refurbished stadiums in Bordeaux, Montpellier, Toulouse, Lyon, Nantes and the Parc des Prince in Paris—all now wonderful sporting arenas. Thus it was a pity that St. Etienne and Lens did not go with the trend and remove their 3 m high fences—if they had done, the events there would have been even more spectacular.

Special thanks must go to all the groundskeepers involved in preparing the playing surfaces, every pitch was in excellent condition, one more reason why almost all the matches were able to reach a technical standard that had not been seen before. A top level game can only be played on a surface that enables the players to demonstrate to the full the level of skill that they bring with them on to the pitch.

The 64 matches in the 10 different cities were all sold out, with a total of 2.5 million spectators attending, giving an average of about 39,000 per game.

The standards of security and comfort in every stadium were of a high level, so that there was no danger at all for spectators of either sex, or for children who came to watch the games. In fact, the ladies turned out in record numbers never before have so many come to watch football matches, making our president’s statement—«The future is feminine»—start to come true in the stands already. Football as a social phenomenon had taken another step forward; the host country’s passion for the game was absorbed by the visitors and this generated a superb atmosphere for the competition.

France 98 was a short-travel World Cup, an advantage for the organizers as well as the teams and the fans who went with them. Eventhe longest stretches between venues could be covered in less than 90 minutes by plane, while many of the cities were linked by TGV as well. With the exception of a few games, the weather conditions were practically ideal, there were no great differences between venues, nor any of the oppressively high temperatures such as had been experienced in the USA in 1994. Under these conditions there was less physical and mental strain on the players and their back-up staff, and the matches benefited from this in that every player was able to give his best.

The organizational arrangement was that no team would play all its games in one city, and so they all had to travel the day before a game, which was fair all round in that no team was put at a disadvantage by this schedule.

The differences between teams in terms of rest and recuperation days or slight differences in travelling times had no important influence on the success or otherwise of any team. The playing schedule for Japan/Korea 2002 will certainly be tightened up a bit, with 5–6 games being played on match days; current TV technology will be able to handle this programme without difficulty.

France 98 lived up to its reputation as a country that welcomes visitors, France offered the 31 incoming teams unique and perfect accommodation arrangements, most of the teams having training facilities very close at hand with all the necessary infrastructure. A final word about CFO and its small army of volunteer workers who very quickly identified with the task they had to do and established good relationships with FIFA and the participating teams. Five years of painstaking detailed work produced an excellently organized tournament, which bore the imprint of the organizing minds behind it and was characterised by a spirit of harmony and cooperation.
World Cup 98: A huge media event!
By Keith Cooper, FIFA Director of Communications

France 98 was always billed as the most media-oriented in the history of the World Cup. This was not a particularly difficult prediction to make, considering the role that the media have come to play in our everyday lives, and especially with regard to sport and to football in particular.

But there had also been concerns that this orientation towards the media may become unduly pervasive.

This was the challenge that FIFA and the CFO faced in planning the 1998 World Cup finals: how to satisfy the demands of the media, and through the media how to satisfy those of an increasingly expectant public, while always preserving the integrity of the game and the welfare of its players.

This conundrum had occupied not only the media services of FIFA and the CFO for much of the four years of intensive planning for the big event, but had also been the subject of lengthy debate within the FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee, especially with regard to the perplexed question of media access to the players.

Media trends in football coverage in recent years have focused more and more on the personalities of the individual players, raising their profile to that of highly visible public figures. Consequently, the media expected to be able to have access to the players at virtually any time, threatening to encroach upon their private sphere and disrupting their serious preparation for the world's premier sports event.

On the other hand, the argument was repeatedly put forward that the World Cup is, anyway, essentially there for the public – who depend upon the media for their information and their entertainment. To cloister teams away and to forbid press access would, in a certain way, be against the object of the entire exercise.

Regional radio and television stations broadcast the matches in 200 countries.
Striking a balance between these philosophies was not an easy matter. The new guidelines which FIFA introduced to bring order to the access to the teams between matches went a long way towards satisfying the media's appetite while preserving a measure of distance and solitude, but as has been seen so many times in the past, cultural attitudes vary greatly and the press of some countries are less easily served than others ....

At the same time, FIFA was concerned to maintain a reasonable balance between the different sectors of the media. In a healthy media environment, everybody -- television, radio, reporters, photographers -- is given equal opportunity. While television is becoming ever more important for the live coverage of the games, radio retains a greater flexibility, reporters constantly have to adapt their reflective writing skills to complement the live broadcast coverage, and photographers relentlessly pursue the original image that serves not only as a factual document but also as an evocation of a mood.

Each sector of the overall media family has its part to play and each deserves to be provided with the best possible facilities in which to do so. Media tribunes in the stadiums occupied large sections of the best-placed seats, with up to 1,750 reporters and 110 television commentator positions for the Final and accordingly fewer for the other matches. Photographers were given the unprecedented opportunity to work from new positions on the touchline as well as from excellent locations in the stands. The post-match mixed zone continued to divide opinions but remains the most productive alternative to the traditional and sterile press conference.

The media centres provided by the CFO set new standards, especially the International Media Centre at the Porte de Versailles in Paris. This huge area accommodated thousands of media representatives around the clock for six weeks, offering facilities on a scale never witnessed before at any single sports event. Combining the press centre with the International Broadcasting Centre, thus bringing all sectors of the media together under one roof, was a most positive concept, reinforcing the sense of co-operation media as well as reducing the need for repetition of facilities.

As had been anticipated, there was a concentration of media representatives in Paris, from where travel to the other venues was greatly facilitated especially by rail. Although a big country by European standards, France was still more manageable than its predecessor, the United States, where covering several matches meant long hours of exhausting travel for reporters. On the other hand, the newly introduced first-round system of teams moving between venues meant that the press were obliged to move with them, instead of being based in one venue, and several teams followed a new trend of establishing their own satellite media centres immediately adjacent to their team headquarters.

The media information services established by the CFO also surpassed anything previously experienced. The INFO on-line system enabled a quick and easy method of disseminating information, although certain technical problems cannot be denied and some members of the media still need to be more regularly exposed to such systems in order to make maximum benefit of them. In addition, daily news briefings by FIFA and the CFO at the International Media Centre in Paris proved a well-received innovation, providing media not only with up-to-date inside information but also giving a daily opportunity to inquire about topical issues.

While the photographers produced superb images of France 98 and the writers continued to find new and more elegant ways to describe the happenings of the 64 matches and occurrences around them, special mention must surely be made of the splendid pictures created by the host broadcaster team of television experts gathered together in the TVRS group. Imaginative production, fascinating slow-motion replays and a thorough understanding of the game and of its individual players helped not only enchant expectant audiences worldwide but also capture new viewers enthralled by the sheer beauty of the pictures produced.

Such a high level of excellence has been attained in the media coverage of the World Cup that it is difficult to contemplate how further improvements may be possible in 2002. Inevitably that will be so, with the technological developments that will surely occur between now and then. But the challenge mentioned earlier will be renewed, and the task of FIFA and the joint organizing committees will be substantially more demanding. It is a challenge that, once again, will require the co-operation of the teams and their players as well as that of the media themselves.
The French were mentally prepared

By Ruedi Zahner (Switzerland), specialist for motivation in top class sport

How were the French able to succeed under the tremendous pressure that was bearing down on them during the competition? Quite simply, they were conscious of it, accepted it and adopted the right attitude to deal with it. All their players were mentally prepared for every situation (even the toughest ones), so that they could give their optimum performance and never let their belief in themselves be shaken. This was the only way to cope with the very high level of expectation and yet still play consistently close to their upper performance limits.

Top performance is brought out in players by the pressure of competition – at the right level

In order for a player and a team to reach their full potential such pressure is essential. This will mean that there are feelings of fear and uncertainty before a competition, as to whether expectations will be fulfilled or not. Such feelings prevent players from being complacent or not taking things seriously enough. In this way a degree of tension is developed (it's the same thing as stage fright for actors), that is shaken off once the competition begins, and then the required energy finds its outlet.

There is a direct connection between the level of tension and the level of performance.

The coach under pressure

At any world championship, coaches are under terrific pressure to succeed. The way to success is only to pass on as much of the pressure as is necessary. An excellent example of this type of management was shown by the French coach Aimé Jacquet; he regulated the pressure on his team by dealing specifically with each player individually, as the need arose, either to boost their courage or to spur them on more, but without diminishing any player's self-confidence. Doubt and fear (= negative emotions) were not part of the vocabulary of the French coaching manual this time round.

Jacquet's talent lay in being able to regulate the pressure on his players so that it had no negative effect (tightening up, being afraid of making a mistake), so that only the positive effect of spurring them on to success was felt.

Developing mental strength (motivation)

Jacquet's team knew exactly what their aims were. His style of motivation followed the line of thinking of the old Greek saying: «If you want to build a boat, first instill in your men a love of the sea. Then they'll build the boat by themselves.» The hope of winning their World Cup in their own country, a dream for any footballer and a chance to become a sporting hero, set up a desire in them that generated its own motivating power and inspired the whole country. It was clear to them all where the journey would hopefully lead and each one knew the reasons for making the attempt. Reminders on the way were: never lose concentration, nor the joy and the fun of playing – keep these important ideas in mind and you will be able to reach the top.

Success always starts with belief

Jacquet said before the tournament started: «What will decide will be belief and confidence in one's own ability.» Or, put another way: the basis for any success is believing that it is possible. Thanks to their specific preparation, the French players had not only confidence in their own ability but also an unshakeable belief that no-one was better prepared than they were. Every one of the squad was convinced that they could achieve their ambition. They went into each game with courage and determination, and with each victory their self-confidence grew and reinforced their belief in themselves.

Being mentally ready

The French were mentally ready for the situation facing them. Jacquet had managed to anchor the idea of winning in each player, or more than that, within the team.

The success of his approach shows that:
1. Strategy is not decisive; far more important are the mental potential, the motivation and the self-belief of each individual player, and of the whole team. What are the best tactics or the greatest potential if motivation and self-belief are missing?
2. The successful modern coach is not primarily a «tactician», but a manager with the right psychological ability to lead his players, by making it possible for each one of them to use his talents to the fullest extent.
3. Proper preparation is of vital importance in order to get the team into the correct mental state (positive emotions), so that they have exactly the right attitude from the start (their first moment on the field).
For the fifth time since 1982, the FIFA World Cup enjoyed the solid support of a group of committed sponsor companies, many of whom have remained loyal to the event throughout that period.

FIFA's thanks go to these partners who continue to demonstrate a thoroughly professional approach in helping promote the World Cup and a respectful understanding for the sensitivities needed in order to protect the integrity of the game itself.

FIFA's appreciation is also expressed to its marketing partner, ISL Worldwide, for the company's customary attentive and diligent co-ordination of all the manifold commercial activities surrounding France 98.
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Mehrdad MASoudi (Canada)</td>
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### Technical Study Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Faouzi MAHJOUB (Tunisia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Harold MAVNE-NICHOLLS (Chile)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Abele MBENGUE (Cameroon)</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Mick MICHELS (Belgium)</td>
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<td>Paul RUSCHETTI (Switzerland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Ricardo SETYON (Brazil)</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Jay BAKER (En-/Line-) (USA)</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Alexander HOLT (En-Line-) (USA)</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>Cheche VIDAL (En-Line-) (USA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Andreas HERBEN (FIFA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Marius SCHNEIDER (FIFA)</td>
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<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Markus SIEGLER (FIFA)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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- Marcel Mao
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- Rolf SIEBOTH (FIFA)
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- Marușus Cotta
- Daniel Schuler
- Antonia Camnisa

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- Rose-Marie Ried
- Daniela Leeb
- Hans-Peter Frei

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- Mirjam Lippuner
- Rhommon Collins
- Vincent Monnier
- Jill Fracco
- Daniela Leeb
- Jacqueline Moresi
- José Ibarra
- Marilyn Jones
- Michele Bacchini
- Françoisess Strussburg
- Javier Otero
Published by Fédération Internationale de Football Association
Editors Jürg Nepfer
with the assistance of the Technical Study Group France 98
Editorial contributions Keith Cooper, Walter Gagg, Volker Roth, Ruedi Zahner
Translations John C. Hurst
Layout Max Müller
Photos Action Images, Allsport, Alfieri, Bongarts, Global News Network, ISO Sports, Daniel Motz, Photo ASI, Sygma Temp Sport, Werek
Lithography Repro Studio B, Zurich
Co-ordination of production Jürg Hager
Production Huber & Co. AG, Grafische Unternehmung und Verlag, Frauenfeld, Switzerland

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Printed in Switzerland